The potential Iranian tragedy.
In his Sunday L.A. Times op-ed, warning against U.S. aggression against Iran, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote (among many other smart things):
Iran has the objective preconditions in terms of education, the place of women in social affairs, and in social aspirations (especially of the youth) to emulate in the foreseeable future the evolution of Turkey. The mullahs are Iran's past, not its future; it is not in our interest to engage in acts that help to reverse that sequence.
This sort of goes hand-in-hand with what Juan Cole pointed out recently: that "the Iranian hard liners are down to a popularity rating in Iran of about 15%." Or the sentiments in this Kevin Sites dispatch to which Neil pointed me back in January. Yes, Ahmadinejad's election (if legit) was a setback for reform and the reformist instinct in Iran, but it's very likely to be an aberation in a longer-run pro-Western trend, one that stands out among Gulf states. Right now, Ahmadinejad is busy strengthening the convictions, or at least buttressing the superficial case, of Western Iran-hawks. But if he ends up with nothing to show for it -- and no real power to effect the domestic populist agenda he campaigned on last fall -- he's finished. On the other hand, if he can demagogue the U.S. into taking the bait and preemptiviely attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, or even seriously threatening to do so, it will do far more to strengthen the case of the anti-reform, hardline forces. (In this game of chicken, to induce an anti-Western backlash at home, Iran's hardliners have every incentive to make sure that American strikes hit a few civilian areas too.) And that could very well launch the mullahs right back into Iran's future.
Iran has the objective preconditions in terms of education, the place of women in social affairs, and in social aspirations (especially of the youth) to emulate in the foreseeable future the evolution of Turkey. The mullahs are Iran's past, not its future; it is not in our interest to engage in acts that help to reverse that sequence.
This sort of goes hand-in-hand with what Juan Cole pointed out recently: that "the Iranian hard liners are down to a popularity rating in Iran of about 15%." Or the sentiments in this Kevin Sites dispatch to which Neil pointed me back in January. Yes, Ahmadinejad's election (if legit) was a setback for reform and the reformist instinct in Iran, but it's very likely to be an aberation in a longer-run pro-Western trend, one that stands out among Gulf states. Right now, Ahmadinejad is busy strengthening the convictions, or at least buttressing the superficial case, of Western Iran-hawks. But if he ends up with nothing to show for it -- and no real power to effect the domestic populist agenda he campaigned on last fall -- he's finished. On the other hand, if he can demagogue the U.S. into taking the bait and preemptiviely attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, or even seriously threatening to do so, it will do far more to strengthen the case of the anti-reform, hardline forces. (In this game of chicken, to induce an anti-Western backlash at home, Iran's hardliners have every incentive to make sure that American strikes hit a few civilian areas too.) And that could very well launch the mullahs right back into Iran's future.
1 Comments:
"(In this game of chicken, to induce an anti-Western backlash at home, Iran's hardliners have every incentive to make sure that American strikes hit a few civilian areas too.) And that could very well launch the mullahs right back into Iran's future."
Oh, great! To improve on his 30% rating, Bush is going to attak someone with a 15% rating. And, in the end, finish with a 30% (or less) rating, while boosting the Iranian to a 75% rating.
Way to go, there! Just what's needed.
Ed
Post a Comment
<< Home