Schroeder's big comeback.
I haven't had time to follow the German elections like I hoped to. But Schroeder's SPD mounted a pretty amazing comeback, winning only 0.9% less of the popular vote than Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU coalition with 98 of 99 districts reporting. Since the Greens came in fourth behind the libertarian Free Democrats, the center-right has a very slight advantage, since both centrist parties have sworn off making deals with Oskar Lafontaine's Left Party (the former communists). But the advantage is slight enough that the CDU will have to bring either the Greens or the SPD into its ruling coalition. Schroeder is obviously feeling his oats, swearing he won't enter into a coaltion with Merkel, and his best option is probably to try to force a coalition-making-stalemate leading to new elections (and hope for the CDU, in the meantime, to torpedo Merkel, creating all sorts of internal strife). Not surprisingly, the markets are unhappy about the left's stronger-than-expected showing.
One thing that's interesting is the moaning from the right and from the European press about how the Germans' circumstances -- which include both the demographic moment and the contribution of its corporatist, personalized-proportional-representation electoral system -- favour the status quo and make it difficult for reformers, either conservative or liberal (but in today's climate mainly conservative) to really get their program enacted. The Paris daily Liberation moans about "Germany..entering that club of nations where the ability of protesters and radicals to cause a nuisance... paralyses long-term policies," and the Swiss Le Temps argues that "Populism triumphs, and moderation... no longer pays", which, for all the America-bashing that went on in the campaign, seems an odd conclusion to draw from an election in which the two historically mainstream parties still scored 70% of the vote between them and where the main dynamic behind the Left Party's showing (mainly at the CDU's expense) seems to be more about the continuing economic dichotomy between the East and West than dilletantish ideological extremism.
Traditionally, the German system gets a fair amount of love from liberals on this side of the Atlantic. Hendrik Hertzberg, for instance, holds the German model up as the sytem to emulate, if we want to replace the weird American one and, presumably, the British-Canadian first-past-the-post one too (I'll add the relevant quote from Hertzberg when I get my copy of Politics back from the reader who borrowed it two months ago. Ahem). The German system is fairer not only because it rules out government-by-plurality but also because it doesn't create the huge mass of basically-irrelevant votes the American and Canadian systems do, imposing only the little bit of voter discipline that your party has to reach 5% on the second (party) ballot to be represented in the Bundestat. It also makes more parties possible than the two enabled by the US system and the three national parties generally enabled by the British-Canadian system. In Germany, there are a whopping five major national-ideological parties to choose from right now. While I'm skeptical that it's lack of choices -- at least directly -- that keeps turnout low in the U.S. and is driving it down in Canada (we Canadians seem to be gaining parties, not losing them as turnout falls), the fact that your vote always counts for something probably does help keep turnout high. The turnout in the German election was 77.7%, down just a bit from 2002. That ought to make us a little bit jealous.
But does the German system really enshrine the moderate status quo? It's not like "more democracy" necessarily prevents ideologically extreme governments from coming to power -- witness Israel. But in Germany, it seems to be working the way its founders intended. As Clay Risen pointed out last month in Slate, Merkel was never likely to become the new Thatcher -- or Bush -- in Germany's corporatist, power-sharing system, even with a big victory at the polls. As it is, voters expressed plenty of dissatisfaction, but the combination of all their disperate voices and demands basically led to the continuation of the current moment, shifting their government at most a little to the right and highlighting regional beefs that need attending to. The conservative reformers, who want more and faster, don't like it. But those who lose out never like it. It's worth asking whether the net welfare effect of democratically-induced moderate gridlock is better or worse than the sort of situation that currently prevails in Canadian and especially US politics with its small number of clear-cut (if you're paying attention) choices and susceptability to radical shifts to the right or left produced relatively small numbers of votes in the right districts. In principle, Germany wins hands down. In practice, it probably depends on who's in power. Which, right now, means that Germany still wins hands down.
One thing that's interesting is the moaning from the right and from the European press about how the Germans' circumstances -- which include both the demographic moment and the contribution of its corporatist, personalized-proportional-representation electoral system -- favour the status quo and make it difficult for reformers, either conservative or liberal (but in today's climate mainly conservative) to really get their program enacted. The Paris daily Liberation moans about "Germany..entering that club of nations where the ability of protesters and radicals to cause a nuisance... paralyses long-term policies," and the Swiss Le Temps argues that "Populism triumphs, and moderation... no longer pays", which, for all the America-bashing that went on in the campaign, seems an odd conclusion to draw from an election in which the two historically mainstream parties still scored 70% of the vote between them and where the main dynamic behind the Left Party's showing (mainly at the CDU's expense) seems to be more about the continuing economic dichotomy between the East and West than dilletantish ideological extremism.
Traditionally, the German system gets a fair amount of love from liberals on this side of the Atlantic. Hendrik Hertzberg, for instance, holds the German model up as the sytem to emulate, if we want to replace the weird American one and, presumably, the British-Canadian first-past-the-post one too (I'll add the relevant quote from Hertzberg when I get my copy of Politics back from the reader who borrowed it two months ago. Ahem). The German system is fairer not only because it rules out government-by-plurality but also because it doesn't create the huge mass of basically-irrelevant votes the American and Canadian systems do, imposing only the little bit of voter discipline that your party has to reach 5% on the second (party) ballot to be represented in the Bundestat. It also makes more parties possible than the two enabled by the US system and the three national parties generally enabled by the British-Canadian system. In Germany, there are a whopping five major national-ideological parties to choose from right now. While I'm skeptical that it's lack of choices -- at least directly -- that keeps turnout low in the U.S. and is driving it down in Canada (we Canadians seem to be gaining parties, not losing them as turnout falls), the fact that your vote always counts for something probably does help keep turnout high. The turnout in the German election was 77.7%, down just a bit from 2002. That ought to make us a little bit jealous.
But does the German system really enshrine the moderate status quo? It's not like "more democracy" necessarily prevents ideologically extreme governments from coming to power -- witness Israel. But in Germany, it seems to be working the way its founders intended. As Clay Risen pointed out last month in Slate, Merkel was never likely to become the new Thatcher -- or Bush -- in Germany's corporatist, power-sharing system, even with a big victory at the polls. As it is, voters expressed plenty of dissatisfaction, but the combination of all their disperate voices and demands basically led to the continuation of the current moment, shifting their government at most a little to the right and highlighting regional beefs that need attending to. The conservative reformers, who want more and faster, don't like it. But those who lose out never like it. It's worth asking whether the net welfare effect of democratically-induced moderate gridlock is better or worse than the sort of situation that currently prevails in Canadian and especially US politics with its small number of clear-cut (if you're paying attention) choices and susceptability to radical shifts to the right or left produced relatively small numbers of votes in the right districts. In principle, Germany wins hands down. In practice, it probably depends on who's in power. Which, right now, means that Germany still wins hands down.
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